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Abstract
We investigate the e¤ect of competition in the nursing homes sector with a two-sided
market approach. More precisely, we investigate the distributional implications across the
three key actors involved (residents, nurses and nursing homes) that arise from the two-
sidedness of the market. Within a Hotelling set up, nursing homes compete for residents
and for nurses, who provide quality to residents, by setting residents price and nurses wage.
Nurses are assumed altruistic and therefore motivated to provide quality. The market is two-
sided because: i) a higher number of residents a¤ects nurses workload, which a¤ects their
willingness to provide labour supply; and ii) a higher number of nurses a¤ects residents
quality through a better matching process and by relaxing nurses time constraints. Our
key ndings are that i) the two-sidedness of the market leads to higher wages for nurses,
which makes the nurses better o¤; ii) this is then passed to residents in the form of higher
prices, which makes residents worse o¤; iii) nursing homes prots are instead una¤ected.
In contrast, when nurses wages are regulated, the two-sidedness of the market implies a
transfer between residents and nursing homes. When residents price are regulated, it implies
a transfer between nurses and nursing homes. These results are robust to institutional
settings which employ pay-for-performance schemes (that reward either nursing homes or
nurses): the two-sidedness of the market is strengthened and residents are still worse o¤.
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1 Introduction
Long term expenditure is expected to rise driven by an ageing population. Projections suggest
that it might more than double by 2060 in several high-income countries (OECD, 2011). Nursing
homes represent a signicant proportion of long term care expenditure (around 0.5% and 1.5% of
GDP in most countries; OECD, 2017) and this is likely to remain the case in the future despite
governments policies that encourage informal care. Governments also increasingly encourage
residentschoice: by developing quality ratings and spreading this information widely, they can
encourage providers to compete. Quality is a key concern in the nursing homes sector and
this is mainly driven by the care that nurses provide within the home. In the US for instance,
nursing homes have been historically understa¤ed and the low levels of quality have motivated
the introduction of minimum nurse sta¢ ng ratios in nursing homes.
This study investigates competition among nursing homes when providers compete both for
residents and for nurses (who provide care to residents) under realistic assumptions which make
the model two-sided. It then explores the distributional implications across the three key actors
involved (residents, nurses and nursing homes) that arise from the two-sidedness of the market.
Nursing homes compete for residents on price and quality. Di¤erently from the hospital
sector, where prices are regulated in most OECD countries (except for the US outside of Medicare
and Medicaid), nursing homes are free to set prices in most OECD countries within a competitive
market. Nursing homes also compete on quality, which is an important aspect of residents
experience.
One important way to inuence the quality of care is by attracting a larger number of nurses.
More nurses can improve quality of care through a better matching between residents and nurses
(residents more likely to get along with the nurse) and a relaxed time constraint for nurses: for
a given number of residents, more nurses implies that each nurse can spend more time with
each individual resident which allows them to provide better care. The empirical evidence also
supports that nurses sta¢ ng levels a¤ect quality of care, as measured by deciencies related
to quality of care and quality of life (Lin, 2014), and incidence of pressure sores and urinary
tract infections (Konetzka, Stearns and Park, 2008). The e¤ect can be quantitatively large.
Increasing nurses sta¢ ng by one standard deviation increases quality by more than 16% (Lin,
2
2014).
The importance of nurses sta¢ ng levels in a¤ecting the demand for nursing homes is exem-
plied in the Medicare web portal Nursing Home Compare which provides case-mix adjusted
sta¢ ng measures that prospective residents can use to choose the nursing home.1 The empiri-
cal evidence also supports that demand responsiveness to quality can be enhanced by publicly
reported quality information, which includes nurses sta¢ ng ratios in addition to clinical indica-
tors (Werner et al., 2012). In turn, this induces nursing homes to compete more aggressively on
quality (Zhao, 2016). In summary, nursing homes have to compete not only on price but also
for nurses in an attempt to increase their quality and attract more residents.
The nursing homes market is two-sided because: i) a higher number of nurses can a¤ect
demand for residents because it implies higher quality (relaxed time constraints for nurses and
better matching between residents and nurses), and ii) a higher number of residents a¤ects nurses
labour supply by a¤ecting nurses working conditions (nurses working under higher pressure with
a larger volume of residents). Both e¤ects create di¤erent types of network externalities between
nurses and residents that are typical of two-sided markets.
The distributional consequences that arise in the presence of the two-sidedness of the market
across residents, nurses and nursing homes, are as follows. The two-sidedness of the market leads
to more intense competition for nurses since their number impacts positively the quality supplied
by their nursing homes, which contributes to higher wages o¤ered to nurses. As a result, nurses
are better o¤. Such increases in wage are however passed to the residents in the form of higher
prices, so that residents are worse o¤. Nursing-home prots are instead una¤ected since the
increase in nurses wages is o¤set by the increase in residents price. By o¤ering a higher wage a
nursing home increases nursesutility directly but also indirectly by reducing the residents-nurse
ratio which is valued by nurses (because of lower workload) and residents (because it implies
a higher quality). These e¤ects depend critically on the assumption that the marginal cost of
providing quality for nurses depends on the resident-nurse ratio.
The two-sidedness of the market matters also if either residents prices or nurses wages are
regulated, but has di¤erent distributional implications. When nurses wages are regulated, the
two-sidedness of the market still increases residents prices, which makes residents worse o¤,
1https://www.medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/Data/About.html
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if the regulated wages are not too high. In turn, this implies a transfer between residents and
nursing homes (rather than between residents and nurses, as in the main model). More precisely,
when the regulated wage is higher than its equilibrium value (without regulation), residents
price is lower, and both e¤ects work at the expense of nursing homes prots. Di¤erently,
when residents price are regulated, the two-sidedness of the market a¤ects nurses wages and
nursing homes prots, and it implies a transfer between nurses and nursing homes. A higher
regulated price lowers residents utility, while it increases nurses wage with an ambiguous e¤ect
on nursing homesprots. A fuller discussion dealing with the distributional implications of
both regulations is given in the conclusion.
Pay for performance (P4P) schemes are increasingly used to incentivise quality of nursing
homes (Miller and Singer Babiarz, 2014). We show that the key insights in terms of the e¤ect
of the two-sidedness of the market on residents prices and nurses wages also hold, and can
be even strengthened, when P4P schemes are used to incentivise quality. We distinguish two
types of P4P schemes. In the rst scenario, a regulator uses a P4P scheme to reward nursing
homes according to their performance on quality indicators. In the second scenario, nursing
homes are allowed themselves to introduce P4P within their organization and reward nurses
with higher quality. In both cases, we still nd that the two-sidedness of the market makes
the residents worse o¤. In the former case, quality remains unchanged (since nurses are not
directly incentivised by the scheme) but P4P amplies the competition e¤ects arising from the
two-sidedness of the market which in turn increases nurses wages even more, which are again
passed to residents in the form of higher prices. In the latter, we show that the P4P scheme
is such that the quality fee paid to nurses is equal to residents valuation of quality. Nurses are
better o¤ as a result since the fee more than compensates for their increase in e¤ort. Residents
are worse o¤ since they are charged a higher price which does not compensate for the higher
quality. Nursing homes pass the higher costs to the residents so that prots remain unchanged.2
Our model is related to two strands of literature: (i) the one that investigates quality
2 In an extension we show that our results generally hold also in the presence of an uncovered market seg-
ment as long as this segment is small, which is in line with empirical evidence (Grabowski and Gruber, 2007;
Mommaerts, 2018), and that the introduction of such uncovered market segment has ambiguous predictions on
the relation between the two-sidedness parameter and equilibrium wage and price therefore providing limited
additional insights to the model. This extension can be justied by some potential residents (with higher degree
of independence in their daily activities) being taken care by informal carers if the price of the nursing home is
too high or the quality too low.
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and price competition within an horizontal di¤erentiation framework (Hotelling/Salop mod-
els) within the health sector,3 and (ii) the literature on two-sided markets that has dramatically
grown during the last decade after the seminal articles of Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006) but
which has mainly been applied to sectors like banking or retail markets that are distinct from
the nursing homes one. Nevertheless, there is a smaller literature which combines both elements.
Bardey and Rochet (2010) analyse the competition between PPO and HMO which both compete
for policyholders one side and to a¢ liate health care providers on the other side. We borrow
from this study that consumers value having a larger pool of providers (doctors, nurses) but in
order to work in an horizontal di¤erentiation set-up we assume that all consumers value them in
the same way.4 Pezzino and Pignataro (2007) make a similar assumption that consumers value
having access to more doctors in a context of hospital competition under regulated price. By
contrast, we assume that the quality is not a decision variable from nursing homes but rather is
endogenously decided by their nurses. Such a decision depends on their workload, which in turn
depends on the resident/nurse ratio. As quality enters positively in nurses and customers utility
function, this assumption yields some analogies to the common network externalities framework
introduced by Bardey et al. (2012, 2014). We develop our two-sided analysis in a Hotelling
framework, following Armstrongs (2006) two-sided model.
2 The model
We use a Hotelling set up with a market characterized by two nursing homes (providers) i =
f1; 2g which are located at the endpoints of the unit line Y = [0; 1]. Residents (consumers) are
uniformly distributed on Y with a total mass normalised to 1. The utility of a resident located
at y 2 Y and who chooses nursing home i is:
Ui(y) = qi   pi   try + 2Ni
Z 1
2Ni
0
(v   z) dz; (1)
3See for example Ma and Burgess (1993), Gravelle (1999), and Brekke, Siciliani and Straume (2012).
4 In other words, the adverse selection e¤ect pointed out by these authors is assumed away here. Boilley (2012)
extends this article and analyses the case where PPO and HMO compete for the same health care providers whereas
Bardey and Rochet (2010) make a local monopoly assumption on this side.
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where qi is the quality of care provided to residents by nursing home i, pi is the price charged by
the nursing home to their residents, tr is the marginal disutility of distance (for example related
to distance to family and friends),  is the marginal benet of quality, and Ni is the number of
nurses employed.
We assume that a higher number of nurses increases residentsutility and satisfaction as a
result of higher chance of a good match between the resident and the nurse. This is captured by
the last term in (1). Analytically, v gives the highest (gross) benet to residents from staying in
a nursing home which is reduced by an amount z if the resident is not matched with her ideal
nurse. Therefore, z captures the cost of matching, which for analytical simplicity, we assume
to be uniformly distributed between zero and one. This degree of satisfaction cannot be known
ex ante as it depends on an ex post interaction between the nurse and the resident. When
residents choose their nursing home, they will take into account that nursing homes with more
nurses are associated in expected terms with a better match and therefore a higher utility.  is
a preference parameter related to the marginal benet of residents from a better nurse-resident
match.5 Solving for the integral in (1) residentsutility can be written as:
Ui(y) = qi   pi   try + 

v   1
4Ni

: (2)
Assuming that quality is high enough to ensure that the market is covered, the demand
functions of nursing homes 1 and 2 are respectively:
D1 =
1
2
+

2tr
(q1   q2) + 1
2tr
(p2   p1)  
8tr

1
N1
  1
N2

; (3)
D2 = 1 D1: (4)
These demand functions suggest that nursing homes with higher quality, lower prices, and a
higher number of nurses attract a larger number of residents.
We now turn to the market for nurses. Nurses are also uniformly distributed on Y with a
total mass normalised to 1. The utility of a nurse located at y 2 Y who works for nursing home
5See Gal-Or (1997) for a similar assumption applied to healthcare markets.
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i is:
Vi(y) = wi + qi   1
2
c
(k   ) + NiDi
q2i   tNy; (5)
where wi is the xed wage paid to the nurse by nursing home i, and tN is the transportation
costs for nurses, which reects the desire to work close from home. We assume that nurses are
altruistic and care about the residents, as it is often argued that nursing is a vocational job.
The assumption that nurses are motivated or altruistic has been recognized for long time within
the health economics literature,6 and more recently in the literature on motivated agents in
the broader public sector.7 Altruism is captured by the positive parameter , and assume that
residents value quality weakly more than nurses,   . Providing quality is however costly
to the nurse. The positive parameter c (k) is (inversely) related to the marginal disutility of
providing quality.
We also critically allow for congestion e¤ects through the positive parameter . We make the
intuitive assumption that for nurses it is more costly to provide quality when the residents-nurses
ratio is high, everything else equal. Nurses will have to work harder to o¤er the same attention
to their residents if the number of residents per nurse increases. We enter  in the cost function
so that the marginal cost of quality is unchanged in equilibrium. Therefore, comparative statics
with respect to  is equivalent to the strength of the two-sidedness of the market in a Common
Network Externality framework.8
Maximising nurses utility with respect to quality, we obtain the rst order condition for the
optimal level of quality chosen by a nurse working for nursing home i:
qi =

c

k    + Ni
Di

: (6)
Quality increases in the nurses altruism and decreases in the nurse-resident ratio of the
nursing home since a higher ratio increases the marginal disutility of providing quality.
6See, e.g., Ellis and McGuire (1986), Chalkley and Malcolmson (1998), Eggleston (2005), Heyes (2005), Jack
(2005), Kaarbøe and Siciliani (2011).
7See, for example, Francois (2000), Murdock (2002), Glazer (2004), Besley and Ghatak (2005), and Francois
and Vlassopoulos (2008) for a literature review.
8This type of two-sidedness introduced in Bardey et al. (2012, 2014) occurs when both sides value the quality
provided and the quality depends positively on the number of providers (nurses) and negatively on the number
of consumers (residents).
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After substitution, the indirect utility function of the nurse working for nursing home i is:
Vi = wi +
2
2c

k    + Ni
Di

  tNy; (7)
which is decreasing in the residents-nurses ratio. Ceteris paribus, it is more pleasant to work in
nursing home i if the nurse has fewer residents to take care of.
The supply functions of nurses in nursing homes 1 and 2 are given by:
N1 =
1
2
+
1
2tN
(w1   w2) + 
2
4ctN

N1
D1
  N2
D2

; (8)
N2 = 1 N1: (9)
Everything else equal, the nursing home that pays a higher wage will attract more nurses.
Moreover, nurses are more willing to work for nursing homes that have low resident-nurse ratios,
which could be interpreted broadly as better working conditions. After substituting for quality,
we can also re-write the demand functions for residents as
D1 =
1
2
+
1
2tr
(p2   p1)  
8tr

1
N1
  1
N2

+

2trc

N1
D1
  N2
D2

; (10)
and D2 = 1   D1: It is worth to emphasize the two-sided nature of the market by noticing
that residentsdemand and nurses supply are inter-related. This arises because the number
of nurses a¤ects positively residentsdemand through better matching (third term in (10)) and
through higher quality, due to lower congestion (fourth term in (10). In turn, a higher number
of residents a¤ects nurses labour supply through higher workload and therefore worse working
conditions (third term in (8)).
The comparative static of residentsdemand and nursessupply with respect to residents
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price and nurseswage is
dD1
dp1
=   1
2

ctN   
2
4D1 (1 D1)

; (11)
dN1
dp1
=
2
8

N1
D21
+
1 N1
(1 D1)2

> 0; (12)
dD1
dw1
=
c
16

1
N21
+
1
(1 N1)2

+

4D1 (1 D1) > 0; (13)
dN1
dw1
=
ctr
2
+

4

N1
D21
+
1 N1
(1 D1)2

> 0; (14)
where  is dened in Appendix 8.1 and is positive if the problem is well behaved. This high-
lights again the two-sidedness of nursing home competition. First, an increase in nurseswage
by nursing home 1 increases nursessupply. This in turn increases residentsdemand since resi-
dents value more nurses, through a better matching process. These two e¤ects are respectively
captured by dN1=dw1 and dD1=dw1 when setting  = 0. There are however two additional
e¤ects at work: a higher number of nurses also reduces the resident-nurse ratio. This reduces
the cost for nurses to provide quality, which further increases nurseswillingness to work for
nursing home 1, and ultimately leads to an increase in quality, which is valued by residents.
An increase in prices charged to residents by nursing home 1 reduces residentsdemand and
therefore also reduces the resident-nurse ratio. The latter makes nurses more willing to work for
nursing home 1 because of better working conditions, and also has a feedback e¤ect on demand:
although facing a higher price residents value the reduced resident-nurse ratio. We assume
that the latter is a second order e¤ect, so that an increase in price always decreases demand.
This seems the most plausible and realistic scenario. At the symmetric equilibrium this implies
ctN > 
2, which as shown below is required for the nursing home maximisation problem to be
well behaved.
2.1 Optimal residents price and nurses wage
The prot function of nursing home 1 is
1 = (p1   g)D1 (p1; p2; w1; w2)  w1N1 (p1; p2; w1; w2) ; (15)
9
where g denotes the marginal cost of having a resident in a nursing home.
The rst order conditions with respect to residentsprice and nurseswage are:
@1
@p1
= (p1   g) @D1
@p1
+D1   w1@N1
@p1
= 0; (16)
@1
@w1
= (p1   g) @D1
@w1
 N1   w1@N1
@w1
= 0: (17)
The rst two terms of the optimality condition for residentsprice p1 are in line with the
traditional monopolistic pricing rule. An increase in price raises revenues on all infra-marginal
resident but also reduces demand. Moreover, this optimality condition (16) contains a new
additional term, which is negative. When setting the price, nursing homes have to take into
account that a higher price will reduce the resident-nurse ratio which will attract a larger number
of nurses that will translate into higher nurses expenditure. This last e¤ect therefore tends to
reduce the price.
The rst order condition for nurseswage w1 is such that it trades o¤the benets from a larger
residentsdemand generated by an increase in quality (better matching and lower resident-nurse
ratio) with the cost of higher wage for nurses. The two-sidedness of this optimality condition
comes from the fact that residentsdemand increases in the wage paid to nurses.9
Within a nursing home, prices charged to residents and wages paid to nurses tend to be
complement :
@21
@p1@w1
=
@D1
@w1
  @N1
@p1
: (18)
The two-sidedness of the nursing home market makes that a higher wage paid to nurses
increases the number of nurses working for a nursing home, which in turn increases quality and
decrease demand sensitivity, therefore allowing nursing homes to charge a higher price. There is
however another e¤ect going in the opposite direction. A higher wage makes a marginal increase
in price more costly since there are more nurses willing to work for the nursing home when prices
are higher due to the lower workload. The latter is generally smaller, so that residentsprice
and nurseswage are generally complements. A su¢ cient condition to ensure that this is the
9The second-order conditions are given by: @
21
@p21
= 2 @D1
@p1
< 0, @
21
@w21
=  2 @N1
@w1
< 0, and @
21
@p21
@21
@w21
>
@21
@p1@w1
2
where @
21
@p1@w1
=   @N1
@p1
+ @D1
@w1
.
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case is that    and D1  0:75 (see Appendix 8.2). We assume this is the case below.
The next expressions summarise whether the strategic complementarity or substitutability
between nursing homesdecision variables, residentsprices and nurseswages.
dp1
dp2
=   1

0B@@D1
@p2
+
@21
@w21 
+
@21
@p1w1
+
@N1
@p2
 
1CA ; (19)
dw1
dw2
=
1

0B@@N1
@w2 
@21
@p21 
+
@21
@p1w1
+
@D1
@w2 
1CA ; (20)
where  > 0 by the second order conditions (see Appendix 8.2), @D1=@p2 =  @D1=@p1 > 0,
@N1=@p2 =  @N1=@p1 < 0, @N1=@w2 =  @N1=@w1 < 0 and @D1=@w2 =  @D1=@w1 < 0. It
suggests that prices are strategic complements. Nurses wages are also strategic complements if
the complementarity between residents prices and nurses wages (captured by @21=@p1w1) or
the residents demand responsiveness to competitors nurses wage is not too high.
2.2 Symmetric equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Suppose that tN   (+ 2) =c <   tN + tr to ensure equilibrium existence.
At a symmetric equilibrium, residentsprices and nurseswages are such that:
p = g + tr +
 (+ 2)
c
;
w =    tN +  (+ 2)
c
;
and nursing homesprots are:
 =
1
2
(tr + tN   ) :
See Appendix 8.3 for proof. The price mark-up charged by nursing homes on residentsside
depends on the transportation cost (tr), which is in line with the standard Hotelling model.
Lower transportation costs imply more competition and a more responsive demand function to
price, which in turn reduce the price. Similarly, the wage paid to nurses is negatively related to
nurses transportation cost (tN ). Lower transportation costs for nurses imply that more nurses
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are more willing to switch provider for a given increase in wage, which implies that nursing
homes will compete more aggressively to attract nurses by o¤ering a higher wage. The wage
paid to nurses is positively related to the marginal residents evaluation of having more nurses
through better matching process.
Both residents prices and nurses wages have an additional term, which is due to the two-
sided nature of the market. The parameter  plays a critical role in the analysis, which recall
measures the degree to which nursesworkload (through the resident-nurse ratio) a¤ects the
marginal cost of quality. If  is zero, the marginal cost of providing quality is independent
of resident-nurse ratio, and the solution reduces to p = g + tr, w =    tN . It is therefore
this parameter that introduces the two-sidedness of the market. When  is positive and the
marginal cost of quality depends on the resident-nurse ratio, nursing homes will compete more
aggressively on wages: by o¤ering a higher wage a nursing home can attempt to attract more
nurses, which also has the potential additional e¤ect of reducing the resident-nurse ratio which is
valued directly by nurses (because of lower workload) and residents (because it implies a higher
quality). Residents however are charged a higher price as a result, and this higher price is entirely
transferred from residents to nurses, such that nursing homesprot is ultimately independent
of any quality considerations. This arises because both sides, i.e. residents like nurses, value
quality. This quality component enters into the class of common network externalities studied in
Bardey et al. (2014) and as it depends on the nurse/resident ratio.10 Only residentsvaluation
for additional nurses a¤ects nursing homesprot: a higher evaluation for nurses () triggers
more competition for nurses which translates into higher wages and lower prots.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, higher altruism leads to higher nurseswage. From a contract
theory perspective we could have expected that nursing homes would take advantage of nurses
vocations to pay them a lower wage, as pointed out in Heyes (2005). Higher altruism amplies
the mechanisms introduced by the two-sidedness of the market (captured by ) leading to an
even more aggressive competition for nurses.
10More generally, if common network externalities (CNE hereafter) are represented by an homogeneous func-
tion, Bardey et al. (2014) show that the rents obtained by the providers, here the nursing homes, at the symmetric
(and covered market) equilibrium depend on the homogeneity degree of such CNE. As the ratio is a 0-degree ho-
mogeneous function, prots are independent of this quality component.
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Finally, a note on equilibrium existence. We require prots to be weakly positive and nurses
wage to be strictly positive. The rst requires residentsevaluation of quality to be not too high
( < tr + tN ). Otherwise, competition leads to ruinous competition where nursing homes make
negative prots in equilibrium. The second requires that residentsvaluation is not too low that
it leads to negative wages ( > tN    (+ 2) =c).
2.3 Residentsand nursesutility and welfare
In the symmetric equilibrium, quality provided is equal to q = k=c, and does not depend on
the two-sidedness of the market parameter . Residentsutility at the symmetric equilibrium
is:
Ui (y) = q
   p + 

v   1
2

  try =  (k    (2 + ))
c
  g   tr + 

v   1
2

  try (21)
which unambiguously decreases in . If the market is two-sided, quality does not vary, neither
it changes the number of nurses in the market, but it increases residents price and therefore
reduces residentsutility.
The nursesutility is given by:
V i (y) =    tN +

2c
(k + 2 (+ 2))  tNy: (22)
Nurses utility instead increases in . If the market is two-sided, their workload is una¤ected in
equilibrium but they receive a higher wage.
Finally, the total welfare is given by the sum of residents and nurses utility and nursing
homes prots:
U + V  + = (+ 2)
k
2c
  3
2
tN   3
2
tr   g + v: (23)
The two-sidedness of the market only implies a transfers from residents to nurses, and does
not a¤ect prots, so that the social welfare remains unchanged.
13
3 Price or wage regulation
In this section, we compare the results of the main model with two other institutional settings.
First, we investigate the scenario when nurses wages are regulated and residents prices are
endogenously determined. We show that the two-sidedness of the market still a¤ects residents
prices despite nurses wages being regulated. Second, we investigate the scenario when prices
are xed or regulated and nurses wage are endogenous. Again, the two-sidedness of the market
a¤ects nurses wages despite prices being regulated.
3.1 Symmetric equilibrium under regulated nurses wages
Suppose that nurses wages are regulated and takes a value w. Using the rst-order condition
for price (16) we obtain:
Proposition 2 At a symmetric equilibrium with a regulated wage w, the price charged to resi-
dents is:
p = g + tr +

ctN   2 ( (   w) + 2tN ) : (24)
Note that ctN   2 > 0 for the second order condition of the price to hold.11 If the market
is not two-sided, we obtain the traditional mark-up pricing: p = g + tr. Instead, if the market
is two-sided, compared to the familiar benchmark, the price charged to residents at equilibrium
depends on the regulated wage. An increase in regulated nurseswage reduces residentsprice.
This arises because a higher price tends to attract nurses at the margin through a more favorable
resident-nurse ratio and therefore tends to exacerbate wage expenditure for nurses. This latter
e¤ect, which is analogous to the one described in Section 2, is larger (in absolute terms) the
higher is the regulated wage. This leads to the (possibly) counter-intuitive result, that the price
charged to residents decreases with the regulated nurseswage (when intuitively we may expect
the higher nurses wage to be passed on to the resident through higher prices). As a result,
residents are always better o¤ when nurseswage increase.
Whether the price under regulated wages is higher or lower compared to the scenario where
nursing homes compete on nurseswage depends on the level of the regulated wage. Re-writing
11The Second Order Condition is @
21
@p21
= 2 @D1
@p1
< 0, and dD1
dp1
=   1
2

ctN   24D1(1 D1)

, which evaluated at
the symmetric equilibrium gives: dD1
dp1
=   1
2
 
ctN   2

< 0.
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(24) as:
p = p +
2
ctN   2 (w
   w) (25)
suggests that the price under regulated wages will be lower whenever the regulated wage is
higher than the wage when nursing homes compete for nurses.
The e¤ect of the two-sidedness parameter on residentsprice is, di¤erently from Section 2,
ambiguous:
@p
@
=
ctN ( (   w) + 2tN )
(ctN   2)2
: (26)
On one hand, it increases the price charged to customers because a higher price tends to
attract nurses at the margin through a more favorable resident-nurse ratio. On the other hand,
it exacerbates the wage expenditure for nurses. The rst e¤ect dominates when the regulated
wage is not too high (w < w  +2tN=), and the two-sidedness works in the same direction
as in Section 2. The di¤erence is that this price increase is not transferred to nurses wage
anymore.
Equilibrium existence requires weakly positive prots:
 =
1
2
(p  g   w) = 1
2

tr + 
 (   w) + 2tN
ctN   2   w

 0; (27)
which implies that nurses (regulated) wage cannot be too high: w  w  tr + 2=c +
2 (   tr) =ctN . Di¤erently from Section 2, the two-sidedness of the market a¤ects prots,
through its e¤ect on prices. Similarly, residents utility is only a¤ected through changes in
prices. Since nurseswages are regulated, nursesutility in equilibrium is not a¤ected by the
two-sidedness parameter. Total welfare is also not a¤ected. The two-sidedness of the market
implies a transfer between residents and the nursing home, rather than between the residents
and the nurses when wages are endogenously determined (as in Section 2).
We conclude by analysing how the degree of competition in the residents or nurses market,
and nursesaltruism, a¤ects prices.
@p
@tr
> 0,
@p
@tN
=  2 2 + c (   w)
(ctN   2)2
;
@p
@
= 2ctN
tN
 
1 + 2

+  (   w)
(ctN   2)2
: (28)
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As expected, lower residents transportation costs imply a more responsive demand function to
price, which reduce residentsprice. Similarly to Section 2, higher altruism increases residents
prices when the markets is two-sided if the regulated wage is not too high. Di¤erently from
Section 2, nursestransportation costs now a¤ect residents price when the market is two-sided,
and a more responsive nursessupply function implies an increase in residentsprice if the wage
is not too high.
3.2 Symmetric equilibrium under regulated prices
Suppose now that prices are regulated with p1 = p2 = bp but nursing homes compete for nurses.
Using the rst-order condition for nurses wage (17) we obtain:
Proposition 3 At a symmetric equilibrium with a regulated price bp, nurseswage bw is:
bw =  (bp  g) c  2
ctr + 2
  tN + tr + 2 (bp  g)
ctr + 2
: (29)
We assume that the regulated price is always su¢ ciently high to rule out corner solutions,
i.e. bp   g  A= (c + 2), where A := ctrtN +  ( (   tr) + 2tN ). The optimal nurses
wage increases with the price mark up. The higher the mark up, the stronger is the incentive
for nursing homes to attract nurses to induce higher quality, higher demand and revenues. The
incentive to increase nurses wage is reinforced when this translates into a larger marginal increase
in residentsdemand (through better matching process, and higher quality due to more favorable
resident-nurse ratio).
Whether the wage under regulated prices is higher or lower compared to the scenario where
nursing homes compete on residentsprice depends on the level of the regulated price:
bw = w + c ( + 2)
ctr + 2
(bp  p) : (30)
If the regulated price is below the price when nursing homes compete in an unregulated market,
then nurses wages will also be lower.
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The e¤ect of the two-sidedness parameter on nurses wages price is, di¤erently from Section
2, ambiguous:
@ bw
@
=
c (tr   ) (2 (bp  g) + tr)
(ctr + 2)
2 : (31)
This e¤ect is positive only if residents transportation costs are high compared to their valuation
of the benets from a better match between nurses and residents. Since residents prices are
regulated, residentsutility in equilibrium is not a¤ected by the two-sidness parameter. The two-
sidedness of the market implies a transfer between the nurses and the nursing home, rather than
between the nurses and the residents when both prices and wages are endogenously determined
(as in Section 2).
We conclude by analysing how the degree of competition in the residents or nurses market,
and nursesaltruism, a¤ects wages.
@ bw
@tN
=  1; @ bw
@tr
=
2 (c + 2)  c(bp  g)
(ctr + 2)
2 ;
@ bw
@
=
2 (tr   ) [c(bp  g) +  (2ctr + )]
(ctr + 2)
2 :
(32)
Lower nurses transportation costs imply a more responsive supply function to wages, which
reduce nurses wage. Di¤erently from Section 2, residents transportation costs a¤ect nurses
wages: lower residents transportation costs (more competition for residents) have an indetermi-
nate e¤ect on nurses wages. Similarly to Section 2, altruism a¤ects nurses wages but the e¤ect is
indeterminate. It is positive only if and only if residentstransportation costs are high compared
to the benets valuation from matching residents with nurses.
Equilibrium prot is given by
b = 1
2
(bp  g   bw) = 1
2

tN + (tr   ) (bp  g) c  2
ctr + 2

; (33)
which is increasing in the regulated price only if the direct e¤ect on prots is not o¤set by
an increase in nurses wage. To ensure at least zero prot the following condition has to hold
(bp  g)  A=c (   tr).12
12This condition is always satised if  < tr. But if  > tr, then this condition is more stringent than the
one required for a weakly positive nurses salary. Therefore, to ensure that both prots and salaries are weakly
positive the following has to hold: bp  g  max fA=c (   tr) ; A=(c + 2)g.
17
4 Pay for performance
P4P schemes which reward quality have become increasingly popular within the health and
long-term care settings. However, the empirical evidence in relation to its e¤ectiveness is mixed
(Miller and Singer Babiarz, 2014). For instance, Werner et al. (2013) did not nd that nursing
homes signicantly improved quality following the introduction of P4P. The authors argue that
current P4P programs may fail to achieve quality improvements because the incentives were
paid to the nursing homes, rather than to their individual sta¤ members.
In this section, we extend the main model in Section 2 by introducing P4P in two plausible
scenarios. First, we consider a P4P scheme nanced by a public funder (e.g. a local or central
goverment) under which nursing homes receive nancial incentives that depend on the level
of quality provided. Second, we assume that nursing homes can remunerate nurses not only
through the xed wage but also through a pay-for-performance scheme. Therefore, nursing
homes compete for nurses not only through the wage but through a fee, set by the nursing
home, for each unit of quality provided.
4.1 Pay for performance at the nursing home level
In a partial equilibrium environment, we assume that nursing homes receive a nancial incentive
 , which is paid by a public funder, for each unit quality provided to residents. In such a case,
nursing home 1 prot function is:
1 = (p1   g)D1 (p1; p2; w1; w2)  w1N1 (p1; p2; w1; w2) + q1: (34)
The rst order conditions for residents price and nurses wage are:
@1
@p1
= (p1   g) @D1
@p1
+
1
2
  w1@N1
@p1
+ 

cD21

@N1
@p1
D1   @D1
@p1
N1

= 0; (35)
@1
@w1
= (p1   g) @D1
@w1
  1
2
  w1@N1
@w1
+ 

cD21

@N1
@w1
D1   @D1
@w1
N1

= 0: (36)
Compared to the benchmark case, we have an additional term that captures the price and
wage e¤ects on quality according to demand and supply responses.
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Proposition 4 In the symmetric equilibrium when a P4P scheme is nanced by a public funder,
we have:
q0 =
k
c
;
p0 = g + tr +
 (+ 2 ( + ))
c
;
w0 =    tN +  (+ 2 ( + ))
c
;

0
=
1
2

tr + tN    +  k
c

:
The proof is provided in the Appendix (section 8.4). When P4P is paid to nursing homes by
a public funder, we nd that P4P does not a¤ect quality. This result is in line with the study by
Werner et al. (2013) that nds that nursing homes did not signicantly improve quality following
the introduction of P4P. Nevertheless, P4P has some distributional implications. Nursing homes
prot increases by the amount of the nancial incentives. Moreover, the P4P scheme exacerbates
the positive (respectively negative) externality that nurses (resp. residents) generate on quality.
Thus, nurses also benet from a wage increase while residents face a higher price. Anatically,
the e¤ect of an increase in the P4P fee  on prices and wages is equivalent to an increase in the
marginal valuation of quality , but has a di¤erent e¤ect on prots, which increase with the fee
but are not a¤ected by residents valuation of quality.
4.2 Pay for performance at the sta¤ level
Consider now that the P4P scheme are paid to nurses by nursing homes. This can be thought as
the nursing home using P4P as an internal management tool to increase quality. Each nursing
home can set a fee fi for each unit of quality provided. The utility of a nurse located at y who
works for nursing home i becomes:
Vi(y) = wi + (+ fi) qi   c
k    + NiDi
q2i
2
  tNy; (37)
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and the level of quality provided is: qi = (+ fi)

k    + NiDi

=c implying a nurse indirect
utility:
Vi(y) = wi +
1
2c
(+ fi)
2

k    + Ni
Di

  tNy: (38)
An increase in the fee increases quality and increases nurses indirect utility. The resident
demand function and nurse supply function are now given by:
D1 =
1
2
+
1
2tr
(p2   p1)  
8tr

1
N1
  1
N2

+

2tr
(q1   q2); (39)
N1 =
1
2
+
1
2tN
(w1   w2) + 
2
4ctN

N1
D1
  N2
D2

+
1
4ctN

(f1)
2

k    + N1
D1

  (f2)2

k    + N2
D2

(40)
with D2 = 1 D1; N2 = 1 N1.
Proposition 5 In the symmetric equilibrium when nursing homes also compete in P4P we have:
f = ;
q =
(+ f) k
c
;
p = g + tr +
[ (+ 2) + kf] (+ f)
c
;
w =    tN +  (+ f
) (+ 2)
c
;
 =
1
2
(tr + tN   ) :
The proof is provided in the Appendix (section 8.4). The key result is that nursing homes
set a quality fee which is equal to the residentsquality valuation. The quality fee does not
depend on the nurses altruism so that the level of quality reects the sum of residents and
nurses valuation, i.e. (+ ). Nursing homes prot is not a¤ected by the introduction of the
quality fee. Nurses overall payment, given by w + fq, is increased in the presence of the
P4P; the quality fee is paid on top of the xed wage, and moreover the introduction of the P4P
scheme stimulates competition for nurses, which increases their xed wage as well. However,
the increase in nursespayment is passed to the residents through an increase in price so that
nursesprots remain unchanged.
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It is straightforward to show that the solution in the absence of the P4P scheme is obtained
when the quality fee is set to zero, so that p > p, w > w and  = , with p   p =
fq + w   w. Nurses always gain from the introduction of the P4P scheme:
V    V  = 
c

 (2 + ) +
k
2
(2+ )

> 0: (41)
Whether residents gain or lose is in principle indeterminate: they gain from higher quality but
pay a higher price:
U   U =  (q   q)  (p   p) =  
c
[k+  (+ 2)] < 0: (42)
The price e¤ect however dominates, and residents have lower utility in the presence of the P4P
scheme. The increase in nurses utility is however higher than the reduction in residents utility,
so that welfare is increased:
W   W  = V +U = 
2k
2c
> 0: (43)
We summarise with the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When the pay for performance scheme is paid by nursing homes to nurses, the
quality fee is equal to residents valuation of quality. The scheme induces an increase in quality
and nurses wage which is passed on to residents prices so that prots are unchanged. Residents
are worse o¤ as a result of higher prices and despite the higher quality. Nurses are better o¤
and total welfare is increased.
See Appendix 8.4 for proof. The proposition highlights that quality and welfare enhance-
ments may come at the cost of higher prices and lower residents utility.
5 Comparison
Table 1 compares the results obtained under the unregulated market with the two regulated
markets covered in section 3 and the two P4P schemes explored in section 4. We use the
equilibrium under the unregulated market as the benchmark. Under nurses wage regulation,
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if the regulated wage is higher (lower) than under the unregulated market, then residents and
nurses are both better (worse) o¤ but nursing homes are worse (better) o¤. Therefore, wage
regulation can improve both residents and nurses utility at the expense of nursing homes prots.
Interestingly, price regulation on residents side works in a very di¤erent way. In such a
case, a reduction (increase) in the price charged to residents reduces (increases) nurses wage,
and therefore regulation has opposite e¤ects on nurses and residents utility, while the e¤ect on
nursing homes prots is indeterminate and is determined by whether the price e¤ects dominates
on the wage e¤ect.
The introduction of pay-for-perfomance schemes increases quality only when it is paid di-
rectly to nurses, otherwise quality is unchanged and P4P only has distributional implications.
Perhaps surprisingly, when P4P are paid to nurses then residents are worse o¤ under P4P be-
cause the increase in quality is more than o¤set by an increase in price. This arises because
nurses succeed to extract residents surplus through two channels. On the one hand, they receive
an additional fee for this quality increase which is just equal to residents valuation of quality.
On the other hand, it also stimulates competition between nursing homes to attract nurses that
contributes to increase their wage. Both e¤ects are contribute to increase residents price.
Table 1. Comparison of di¤erent scenarios
U V  W
 
w > w, wage regulation > 0 > 0 < 0 = 0
 
w < w, wage regulation < 0 < 0 > 0 = 0
 
p < p, price regulation > 0 < 0 ? 0 = 0
 
p > p; price regulation < 0 > 0 ? 0 = 0
 > 0, introduction of P4P at nursing homes level < 0 > 0 > 0 = 0
f > 0; introduction of P4P at nurses level < 0 > 0 = 0 > 0
6 Uncovered residents market
In this section, we investigate the scenario when the reservation utility of some residents is not
high enough to guarantee a covered market. We assume that there are two types of residentsm 2
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fH;Lg who di¤er in their gross valuation of treatment in proportion  and 1  , respectively.
Their utility function is
Ui(y) =
8><>: S + qi   pi   try + 

v   14Ni

if m = H;
s+ qi   pi   try + 

v   14Ni

if m = L;
(44)
where S > s. This parameter could be related to the degree of autonomy (e.g. degree of
independence in their daily activities) so that some potential residents are not willing to go to
a nursing home if the price is too high or the quality too low relative to living by themselves
or with an informal carer. The nurses supply function remains unchanged. We characterize the
symmetric equilibrium in such an environment. We focus on equilibria where the H-segment is
fully covered, and the L-segment is only partially covered.
For the H-segment the market is covered and the demand functions for the two nursing
homes are:
DH1 =
1
2
+
1
2tr
(p2   p1)  
8tr

1
N1
  1
N2

+

2tr

c

N1
D1
  N2
D2

; (45)
DH2 = 1 DH1 :
For the L-segment, the market is uncovered and the demand functions are:
DLi =
1
tr


c

k    + Ni
Di

  pi + 

v   1
4Ni

; 8i = f1; 2g: (46)
To keep the computations simpler we set  = 0, given that the role of this parameter has been
explored in Section 2. Total demand for nursing home 1 is given by
D1 = 

1
2
+
1
2tr
(p2   p1) + 
2tr

c

N1
D1
  N2
D2

+
1  
tr


c

k    + N1
D1

  p1

; (47)
and an analogous demand can be obtained for nursing home 2, D2.
The following proposition is obtained.
Proposition 7 At the symmetric equilibrium (D1 = D2 = D and N1 = N2 = 1=2), residents
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price and nurses wage are:
p   g = 2trD
(p; )
(2  ) +
 (+ 4D(p; ))
8 (D(p; ))2
;
w =

c


2D(p; )
+
2
2  

  tN ;
where equilibrium demand is implicitly dened by the function
F (D; p; )  D(p; )  1  
tr


c

k    +  1
2D(p; )

  p

= 0;
and is decreasing in price and increasing in the two-sidedness parameter:
dD
dp
=  1  
tr
1
@F=@D
< 0;
dD
d
=
1  
tr

c

1
2D
  1

1
@F=@D
> 0;
where @F=@D = 1 + ((1  ) ) =

2ctr (D
)2

> 0.
See Appendix (Section 8.5) for proof. The e¤ect of the two-sidedness parameter on residents
price is given by:
dp
d
=
1
1  dGdD :dD

dp

 (+ 2D(p; ))
8c (D(p; ))2
  dG
dD
:
dD
d

; (48)
where
G(D; p; )  p   g   2trD
(p; )
2    
 (+ 4D(p; ))
8 (D(p; ))2
= 0; (49)
with dG=dD =  2tr= (2  ) +  (+ 4) =4(D)3 7 0 (by the implicit function theorem).
Compared to Section 2, there are now some additional e¤ects which relate to changes in equi-
librium demand.
When the size of uncovered market is small (so that  is close to 1), then dD=dp and dD=d
are small and the two-sidedness parameter increases price, dp=d > 0, as in the main model.
Therefore, the results obtained in Section 2 are robust to the inclusion of an uncovered market
as long as this market is relatively small. Moreover, given that dG=dD 7 0, the introduction
of an uncovered market segment could in principle reinforce or weaken the relation between the
two-sidedness parameter and equilibrium price.
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The e¤ect of the two-sidedness parameter on nurses wage is given by:
dw
d
= 


2D
+
2
(2  )

  
2
2 (D)2

dD
dp
dp
d
+
dD
d

: (50)
Again, when the size of uncovered market is small (so that  is close to 1), then dD=dp and
dD=d are small and the two-sidedness parameter increases nurses wage, dw=d > 0, as in the
main model. Given that dp=d 7 0, the introduction of an uncovered market segment could
reinforce or weaken the relation between the two-sidedness parameter and equilibrium wage.
The empirical evidence does indeed conrm that demand for nursing homes is generally
inelastic (Grabowski and Gruber, 2007; Mommaerts, 2018) and that it is only residents with
lower dependence who are like to respond to changes in market conditions.
7 Conclusion
This study has investigated the market for nursing homes using a two-sided market approach.
Our key assumptions, which are in line with the empirical evidence (see Introduction) are that
i) a higher number of nurses can a¤ect demand for residents because it potentially implies
higher quality (through better matching and relaxed time constraints), and ii) a higher number
residents a¤ects nurses labour supply by a¤ecting nurses working conditions (nurses working
under higher pressure with a larger volume of residents). It is the combination of these two
assumptions which makes the market two-sided.
Our main result is that the two-sidedness in the market has distributional implications as
it leads to more intense competition for nurses and to higher wages, so that nurses are better
o¤. Such increases in wage are then passed to the residents in the form of higher price, which
makes the residents worse o¤. Nursing homes prots are instead una¤ected since the increase
in nurses wages is exactly o¤set by the increase in price. By o¤ering a higher wage a nursing
home increases nurses utility directly but also indirectly by reducing the residents-nurse ratio
which is valued by nurses (because of lower workload) and residents (because it translates into a
higher quality). These incentive e¤ects depend critically on how the resident-nurse ratio a¤ects
nurses utility and therefore the quality they provide. When the resident-nurse ratio does not
a¤ect directly nurses utility, both nurses wages and residents prices tend to be lower.
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The two-sidedness of the market matters and has di¤erent distributional implications if either
residents price or nurses wage is regulated. When nurses wages are regulated, the two-sidedness
of the market implies a transfer between residents and nursing homes. When residents price is
regulated, it instead implies a transfer between nurses and nursing homes.
Our results have therefore implications for the regulation of nursing homes sector. Suppose
that an unregulated market, where prices and wages are endogenous, leads to resident prices
which are considered excessive by the regulator (e.g. an anti-trust authority, health ministry,
local and federal authorities). Two regulatory interventions are possible. We show, counter-
intuitively, that an increase in the regulated nurses wage implies a reduction in residents price.
Then, regulating the nurses wages at a level which is higher than the wage in the unregulated
market, will also reduce residents price. Both nurses and residents are better o¤ as a result,
while nursing homes prots will correspondingly reduce. An alternative way to reduce residents
price is for the regulator to introduce price regulation. The introduction of a regulated price,
which is below the price in an unregulated market, will make residents better o¤, but in this
scenario will instead compress nurses wage, and might also reduce nurses prots. This form of
price regulation therefore generates a transfer from nurses (and potentially nursing homes) to
residents.
Finally, we show that policy interventions which facilitate the introduction of pay for perfor-
mance schemes (e.g. by developing reliable quality metrics) at the nursing homes level, rather
than the sta¤ level, do not a¤ect the quality provided, which seems in line with mixed empirical
evidence in relation to its e¤ectiveness (Miller and Singer Babiarz, 2014). In contrast, P4P which
are paid by nursing homes to nurses have the intended e¤ect of improving quality. They also
increase the scope for competition for nurses, which tranlates into larger wages for nurses and
higher nurses utility. Our analysis however highligths an adverse e¤ect for residents. Despite
beneting from higher quality, residents are worse o¤ since the higher price that they are charged
does not compensate for the higher quality, while nursing homes prots are unchanged. Again,
the two-sidedness of the market does not favour residents. Overall, our analysis highlights that
policy evaluations that empirically test the e¤ect of the introduction of P4P schemes in nursing
homes markets should not only focus on quality outcomes but also on its e¤ect on nursing homes
prots and residents prices, and more broadly its distributional consequences.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Demand function analysis
The demand functions system is given by:
D1 =
1
2
+

2tr
(q1   q2) + 1
2tr
(p2   p1)  
8tr

1
N1
  1
N2

; (51)
D2 = 1 D1;
N1 =
1
2
+
1
2tN
(w1   w2) + 
2
4ctN

N1
D1
  N2
D2

;
N2 = 1 N1:
Consider the following functions:
 D = D1   1
2
  
2ctr

N1
D1
  1 N1
1 D1

  1
2tr
(p2   p1) + 
8tr

1
N1
  1
1 N1

; (52)
 N = N1   1
2
  1
2tN
(w1   w2)  
2
4ctN

N1
D1
  1 N1
1 D1

:
Totally di¤erentiating, we obtain:
264 1 + 2ctr

N1
D21
+ 1 N1
(1 D1)2

  2ctrD1(1 D1)  

8tr

1
N21
+ 1
(1 N1)2

2
4ctN

N1
D21
+ 1 N1
(1 D1)2

1  24ctND1(1 D1)
375
264 dD1
dN1
375 =  
264 12tr
0
375 dp1:
(53)
Applying the Cramers rule we obtain:
dD1
dp1
=   1
2

ctN   
2
4D1 (1 D1)

; (54)
where
 : = ctrtN det = ctrtN + 


32tr

1
N21
+
1
(1 N1)2

N1
D21
+
1 N1
(1 D1)2

  tr

1
D1
+
1
1 D1

+2tN

N1
D21
+
1 N1
(1 D1)2

; (55)
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which is positive under minimal regularity conditions. Similarly, we have:
dN1
dp1
=
2
8

N1
D21
+
1 N1
(1 D1)2

: (56)
Di¤erentiating with respect to w1 and applying Cramers rule gives:
dD1
dw1
=

4D1 (1 D1) +
c
16

1
N21
+
1
(1 N1)2

; (57)
dN1
dw1
=
ctr
2
+

4

N1
D21
+
1 N1
(1 D1)2

: (58)
8.2 Prot complementarity and substitutability in price and wage
The e¤ect of an increase in wage on the marginal protability of price is:
@21
@p1@w1
=

4
2D1 (1 D1)  
h
(1 N1)D21 +N1 (1 D1)2
i
2D21 (1 D1)2
+
c
16

1
N21
+
1
(1 N1)2

:
(59)
Suppose that we set altruism at the highest possible value,  = , then:
@21
@p1@w1
=

4
(2D1   1)N1 +D1 (2  3D1)
2D21 (1 D1)2
+
c
16

1
N21
+
1
(1 N1)2

; (60)
which is always positive when D1  0:75.
Di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions with respect to p2 gives:264 @21@p21 @21@p1w1
@21
@w1p1
@21
@w21
375
264 dp1
dw1
375 =  
264 @D1@p2
 @N1@p2
375 dp2: (61)
Applying Cramers rule yields:
dp1
dp2
=
1


 @D1@p2 @
21
@p1w1
@N1
@p2
@21
@w21
 =  
1


@D1
@p2
@21
@w21
+
@21
@p1w1
@N1
@p2

> 0; (62)
where
 :=
@21
@p21
@21
@w21
 

@21
@p1w1
2
> 0: (63)
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Di¤erentiating the rst-order conditions with respect to w2 gives:264 @21@p21 @21@p1w1
@21
@w1p1
@21
@w21
375
264 dp1
dw1
375 =  
264 @D1@w2
 @N1@w2
375 dw2: (64)
Applying Cramers rule yields:
dw1
dw2
=
1


@21
@p21
 @D1@w2
@21
@w1p1
@N1
@w2
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1


@N1
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@21
@p21
+
@21
@p1w1
@D1
@w2

: (65)
8.3 Symmetric equilibrium
The rst-order conditions evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium are:
@1
@p1
= (p1   g) @D1
@p1
+
1
2
  w1@N1
@p1
= 0; (66)
@1
@w1
= (p1   g) @D1
@w1
  1
2
  w1@N1
@w1
= 0: (67)
where
dD1
dp1
=  ctN   
2
2A
;
dN1
dp1
=
2
2A
; (68)
dN1
dw1
=
ctr + 2
2A
;
dD1
dw1
=
c+ 2
2A
; (69)
with
A =: ctrtN +  ( (   tr) + 2tN ) : (70)
We obtain:
p1   g =
w1
@N1
@p1
  12
@D1
@p1
; w1 =
(p1   g) @D1@w1   12
@N1
@w1
: (71)
Substituting for the price into the wage equation, we obtain
w1 =
@D1
@p1
+ @D1@w1
2

@N1
@p1
@D1
@w1
  @N1@w1 @D1@p1
 =    tN +  (+ 2)
c
: (72)
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Substituting the equilibrium wage into the price equation, we obtain
p1   g =
w1
@N1
@p1
  12
@D1
@p1
= tr +
 (2 + )
c
: (73)
At the symmetric equilibrium, nursing homesprot are:
1 =
1
2

tr +
 (2 + )
c
+ tN    (2 + ) + c
c

=
1
2
(tr + tN   ) : (74)
8.4 Pay for performance
Pay for performance at the nursing home level. The rst order condition for price is:
(p1   g) =
1
2   w1 @N1@p1 + 

cD21

@N1
@p1
D1   @D1@p1 N1

@D1
@p1
: (75)
Substituing in the rst order condition for wage, we obtain:
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Thus, we have:
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 + 2
c
:
Pay for performance at the sta¤ level. When P4P are paid to nurses, the demand and
33
supply function are modied. At the symmetric equilibrium we obtain:
dD1
dp1
=
 1
2ctrtN det
h
ctN   (+ f)2 
i
; (77)
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1
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tr +  (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c
i
:
Since the quality provided by nurses is received by each resident, each nursing home i has
to pay fiqiDi. Then, nursing home i prot function is:
1 = (p1   g   f1q1)D1 (p1; p2; w1; w2; f1; f2)  w1N1 (p1; p2; w1; w2; f1; f2) : (78)
Substituting quality in nursing home prot yields:
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c
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The rst-order conditions with respect to p1, w1 and f1 are respectively:
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(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Di¤erently from Section 2, nursing home 1 here also chooses the fee f1 to maximize its prot.
It is such that the marginal marginal revenue, i.e. the mark-up p1   g   (k   )f1 (+ f1) =c
34
multiplied by the marginal increase in demand (@D1=@f1), is equal to the marginal cost due
to the increase in the fee, given by (2f1 + ) (N1 + (k   )D1) =c, and the marginal cost of
increasing the number of nurses, given by (w1 + (+ f1) f1=c)(@N1=@f1).
8.5 Uncovered residents market
The residents demand and nurses supply functions are implicitly given by
 D = D1   
2
  (1  )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)
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Di¤erentiation of this system with respect to p1 and w1 yields respectively:0B@ 1 + 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Applying the Cramers rule, we obtain:
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The determinant is given by:
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Symmetric equilibrium
We dene e := @N1
@p1
@D1
@w1
  @N1
@w1
@D1
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=
1fdet 2  4trtN : (89)
By substitution, the equilibrium price and wage are:
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